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Introduction 
The period since early 2004 has seen a significant expansion of the direct role of the Russian 
state in owning and managing industrial assets, particularly in ‘strategic sectors’ of the economy, 
such as power-generation machines, aviation, oil and finance. Increasingly, policy seems to have 
been focused less on market reforms than on tightening the state’s grip on the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy. Many factors have contributed to this shift – factional, ideological, 
geopolitical and conjunctural – and, as will be argued below, there is not one single process at 
work, but several. This chapter seeks to understand what has been driving the expansion of state 
ownership in Russia over the recent past and what that expansion might imply for the future. Its 
central conclusion is that a great deal of the explanation for this trend is in fact structural. While 
press coverage and public discussion have largely focused on factional politics and the political 
conjuncture – particularly conflicts between the Kremlin and big business and rivalry among 
Kremlin ‘clans’ ahead of the Putin succession in 2008 – a deeper understanding of the growth of 
the state requires an examination of the interaction between state capacities and Russia’s 
industrial structure.  
The chapter begins with a look at the scale and scope of the recent expansion of state 
ownership. This is followed by an analysis of the interaction between Russia’s economic 
structure and its political institutions, which highlights the role that the characteristics of specific 
branches of industry may play in Russia’s political economy. The oil industry receives particular 
attention in this context. Finally, the chapter looks briefly at the implications of recent trends for 
Russia’s future.  
The scope of expanding state ownership  
The trend towards state expansion is unmistakable. To be sure, the Russian government continues 
to stress its commitment to further privatisation and to economic development based on private 
entrepreneurship and competitive markets; individual acquisitions have consistently been 
explained as ‘one-off’ events dictated by the specific circumstances of particular companies or 
sectors. Each is in some way exceptional. Yet the overall scale of the expansion has been 
remarkable (Table 1). According to one recent estimate, the state-owned share of Russia’s equity 
market capitalisation rose from just 20% in mid-2003 to 35% in early 2007.2 To some extent, of 
course, this reflects the fact that the state’s shareholdings are concentrated in oil and other 
minerals sectors, and the values of those companies have out-performed the market as a whole. 
However, that is far from the whole story: at the end of 2003, the state held about 11% of the 
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voting shares in Russia’s 20 largest companies by market capitalisation. Three years later, the 
figure was 39% and rising. Since the composition of the top 20 changed very little, this increase 
 
Company Sector Date
Guta Bank Banking August 2004
Mosenergo Electric power Summer-Autumn 2004
Promstroibank St Petersburg Banking September 2004
Atomstroieksport Nuclear 
construction October 2004
RAO UES Electric power Autumn 2004
Tuapse oil refinery Oil refining December 2004
Yuganskneftegaz Oil and gas December 2004
Tambeyneftegaz Oil and gas May 2005
Northgas Oil and gas June 2005
Izvestiya (daily newspaper), 
Chas pik




Gazprom Oil and gas July 2005
Selkupneftegaz Oil and gas July 2005
Sibneft Oil and gas October 2005
Verkhnechonskneftegaz Oil and gas October 2005
AvtoVAZ Autos October 2005
OMZ Machine-building November 2005
Ulan Ude Aviation Plant, 
Moscow Helicopter Plant, Kazan 
Helicopter Plant, Kamov 
Holding, Rosvertol, Moscow 
Machine-building Plant "Vpered", 
OAO "SMPP"
Aviation 2005
Power Machines (Silovye 
mashiny ) Machine-building December 2005
Udmurtneft Oil June 2006
Rosneft purchases 34% stake from independent gas 
producer Novatek.
Rosneft purchases 25.9% stake from Interros Holding.
Gazprom-controlled Gazprombank purchases a 75% 
stake.
Rosneft acquires a 51% stake from Sinopec after the 
latter buys 96.7% from TNK-BP for an estimated $3.5bn.
Table 1. Major state acquisitions, 2004-07
Electricity monopoly RAO UES purchases 22.4% stake, 
raising its stake above 25%, and acquires voting rights 
to another 30.4% until end-2007.
Gazprom-controlled Gazprombank purchases 54% 
stake.
State-owned defence company Oboronprom takes 
control of these enterprises in the course of forming a 
single, state-controlled helicopter holding via the 
consolidation of shares already held by the state, 
purchase of additional shares and share swaps.
State-owned Rosneftegaz purchases 10.7% of Gazprom 
to raise state's direct stake in Gazprom above 50%. 
State-owned gas monopoly OAO Gazprom buys 69.66% 
stake for $13.1bn.
State arms export concern Rosoboroneksport takes 
control over 62% and installs new management.
State-owned bank Vneshtorgbank purchases 85.8% 
stake with central bank support.
Vneshtorgbank purchases a blocking (25%+1 share) 
stake.
Mechanism
Gazprom-Media purchases control. 
Gazprom raises its stake above “blocking” (25%+1) 
level.
Gazprom raises its stake to 10.5%
Gazprom regains control of independent gas producer 
Northgas, taking over a 51% stake following litigation.
Gazprombank purchases a 25% stake from Novatek.
Rosneft purchases 40% from minority shareholders to 
take full control of the refinery.
Rosneft purchases 76.8% stake from the firm OOO 
"Baikalfinansgrupp", the winner of a state-organised 
auction of Yuganskneftegaz shares to settle tax debts.
 




Sibneftegaz Gas June 2006
Novatek Gas June-July 2006
VSMPO-Avisma Titanium September 2006
Komsomol'skaya pravda Media November 2006
Yamal SPG Gas November 2006
Yukos legacy assets Oil and others March-May 2007
Table 1. Continued
Mechanism
Gazprombank-invest and Gazprominvestkholding buy 
25.1 and 74.9% respectively, securing Gazprom’s 
control over the Yuzhno-Tambey gas condensate 
deposit.
Rosneft and Gazprom win bankruptcy auctions for 
stakes in Tomskneft, VSNK, Samaraneftegaz, Yukos 
Ladoga, Belgorodnefteprodukt, Bryansknefteprodukt, 
Voronezhnefteprodukt, Lipetsknefteprodukt, 
Oryolnefteprodukt, Penzanefteprodukt, 
Tambovnefteprodukt, Ulyanovsknefteprodukt, U-Tver, 
Yukos Petroleum, Aviaterminal and Yukos Aviation.
Source : OECD from various sources.
Gazprom purchases a 19.9% stake for a sum reportedly 
exceeding $ 2bn.
Note : The table excludes acquisition of foreign assets by state-owned companies.
Gazprombank purchases a 51% stake from Itera.
State arms export concern Rosoboroneksport purchases 
41% stake for an undisclosed sum.
Gazprom-Media buys the popular daily.
 
reflected state acquisitions rather than changes in relative stock prices.3 Indeed, between 
September 2004, when ConocoPhillips acquired 7.6% of Lukoil from the government, and 
October 2006, when a $30bn merger between aluminium giants RusAl and SUAl was announced, 
no major industrial or financial asset in Russia passed into the hands of a new private owner: all 
major changes of ownership involved acquisitions by the state or by state-owned companies. 
The growth of the state has, of course, been most pronounced in the energy sector. In 
2003, state-controlled companies accounted for about 16.0% of crude production. By early 2007, 
that figure had exceeded 40% and was still rising.4 However, as Table 1 makes clear, the 
expansion of the state encompassed a wide range of sectors, many of which it would be hard to 
call ‘strategic’, even on the most elastic understanding of that concept. From a domestic political 
perspective, the expansion in media is perhaps most disturbing, reinforcing, as it does, concerns 
about ‘managed democracy’ in Russia. There has also been a wide variation in the circumstances 
that have prompted the state or state-owned companies to expand their holdings: the state has 
intervened in response to perceived market failures (such as the troubles at AvtoVAZ and in the 
military aviation sector) and also in response to apparent market success (Yukos). And while the 
government has initiated or supported some of the acquisitions as part of its industrial policies, 
cash-rich state companies have been behind much of the activity – sometimes over the vociferous 
objections of leading ministers but apparently with the implicit backing of officials in the 
Presidential Administration.  
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The legal and political onslaught against the oil company Yukos has, of course, been the 
most visible and controversial sign of the shift towards greater state control. The expropriation of 
Yukos assets in a series of auctions to settle tax debts and bankruptcy claims has represented the 
largest and most crudely engineered instance of re-nationalisation to date.5 Nevertheless, the 
Yukos case remains unique as an instance of straightforward, judicially administered 
expropriation: no other company has found itself under the kind of pressure brought to bear on 
Yukos, and most other state acquisitions have involved at least the appearance of orderly 
commercial transactions. However, it would be difficult to argue that the state has been paying 
fair market value for its new acquisitions: many of the businesses listed in Table 1 changed hands 
after their previous owners came under mounting regulatory, legal and political pressure. Various 
members of the Sakhalin oil and gas consortia came under such pressure prior to selling stakes to 
Gazprom and Rosneft, and so did the owners of Tambeyneftegaz, Nortgaz and Novatek, to name 
but three. In the case of AvtoVAZ, the takeover was executed without any formal purchase being 
necessary. Thus, while the methods used to bring assets back into state ownership have generally 
been somewhat more civilised than the heavy-handed tactics used against Yukos, they have often 
involved a degree of coercion that would be hard to reconcile with any respect for property 
rights. The methods by which the state has been making acquisitions are thus as much a source of 
concern as is the fact of increasing state ownership.  
It would be a mistake to see this expansion of the state as proceeding according to some 
well defined plan – different groups appear to be pursuing different agendas, often in rivalry with 
one another. However, the process is neither random nor chaotic: there is clearly a coherent 
approach towards resource sectors, which merit special consideration, and the general context is 
favourable towards state expansion in general. The once bankrupt Russian state now has both the 
cash and the coercive capacity to acquire what it wants, and private owners are unpopular and 
widely regarded by the public as illegitimate, which makes them particularly vulnerable to 
official pressure.6 Moreover, the authorities in Russia, anxious to pursue ambitious development 
goals very rapidly, appear increasingly impatient of indirect methods of economic governance, 
such as regulation, and wary of the uncertainties involved in reliance on market-based solutions. 
For politicians in a hurry, direct intervention offers a degree of (apparent) control and certainty 
about outcomes that reliance on markets cannot. All this, then, makes for an environment in 
which a number of state actors have the means, the motive and the opportunity to extend the 
state’s control over important industrial and financial assets.  
Russian industrial structure and state control  
Underlying all of the above considerations is the industrial structure that Russia inherited from 
the Soviet Union. When a state’s production/export structure is highly concentrated – as Russia’s 
undoubtedly is – the character of its leading sector(s) can shape its political economy, especially 
if state institutions are relatively weak.7 The politics of state ownership are thus influenced by the 
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sectoral characteristics not only of Russia’s mineral sectors but also of much of its heavy 
manufacturing.  
The problem may be summarised as follows. An unusually large share of Russian 
industrial production is generated by sectors that are capital intensive and characterised both by a 
high degree of asset specificity8 and significant economies of scale. Such sectors tend to be 
subject to very high barriers to entry and exit, and are generally dominated by a small number of 
large companies. This presents two political problems, which can be particularly acute in 
situations of state weakness. First, as Sutela (2005) has observed, someone must own these 
companies. Secondly, regardless of who owns them, such companies tend to be very demanding 
vis-à-vis the state: their size means that they are likely to be very politically powerful and their 
asset specificity is likely to make them relatively inflexible – that is, faced with changing 
circumstances, they will find it difficult to adapt themselves and will therefore lobby the 
government to adapt its policies in order to support or protect them. Faced with such companies, 
weak states, in particular, often find state ownership appealing, as they feel threatened by the 
power of private owners, whether foreign or domestic. Where the state’s administrative, 
extractive and regulatory capacities are weak, state leaders may fear exploitation by private 
owners, whom they will find difficult to govern. They may also fear ‘state capture’.9 Moreover, if 
the polity is insufficiently robust, conflicts among domestic private owners could prove difficult 
to contain and might even be destabilising: one need only recall some of the ‘kompromat wars’ in 
Russia’s recent past to see the relevance of this concern for Russia’s rulers. Finally, foreign 
domination of leading sectors may be seen as politically unacceptable to sovereignty-conscious 
elites, particularly where natural resources are concerned. Clearly, if foreign ownership is 
rejected and domestic private ownership is regarded as dangerous, then state ownership remains 
the only feasible solution.10  
That, to put the matter very briefly, is what seems to have happened in Russia. Given its 
industrial structure, Russia would probably have a fairly high concentration of ownership of 
industrial assets in any circumstances, but this concentration was even greater in the early 2000s 
as a result of the flawed privatisation processes of the 1990s, which were largely geared to 
excluding foreigners and ensuring that the country’s most valuable industrial assets passed into 
the hands of a few very well connected businessmen. The state thus found itself faced with the 
need to govern an economy dominated by a small number of relatively large private companies – 
companies, moreover, whose owners had demonstrated their willingness to meddle extensively in 
electoral and policy-making processes in order to advance their interests. Both the legal order in 
Russia and the state’s administrative and regulatory capacities were and are weak. There was thus 
an obvious temptation to rely on direct control rather than on contract, regulation and taxation. In 
the Russian case, this temptation was probably all the greater precisely because, whatever its 
                                                   
8. In other words, assets to support particular purposes would have far lower value if they were redeployed 
for any other purpose and might, indeed, prove extremely expensive or even impossible to redeploy in any 
case.  
9. On the concept of ‘state capture’, with particular reference to transition countries, see Hellman et al. 
(2000). 
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other weaknesses, the Russian state possesses very substantial coercive capacities, capacities that 
are arguably out of all proportion to any of its other capabilities.11 
Re-nationalising the oil sector: the return of the ‘obsolescing bargain’? 
The foregoing arguments apply with particular force to minerals sectors, particularly oil. Most 
major oil-producing countries have state-dominated industries, and this is also true, albeit to a 
lesser extent, of many other mineral sectors. Indeed, Russia prior to 2003 was the only major oil 
exporter in the world with a predominantly private oil industry. The leading role of the private 
sector was an anomaly, and it might thus be argued that Russia is merely moving towards the 
international norm.12  
If we ask why major mineral sectors tend to be state-dominated worldwide, at least two 
factors, in addition to those discussed above, would seem to merit attention. First, state 
ownership of the subsoil is almost universal; if private companies are to be involved in resource 
extraction, then they will act as the state’s agents rather than as resource owners in their own 
right. The contracts involved will therefore need to be very well designed and very carefully 
monitored in order to ensure that agency losses are kept to a minimum and that the state’s 
property rights are not violated. The more technically complex the conditions of extraction, the 
more difficult this will be.13 Secondly, politicians are likely to want to dispose of resource rents 
as freely as possible, particularly in societies where democratic accountability is in any case low. 
Capturing resource rents from private agents via contract and taxation may be more efficient than 
reliance on direct control, but it is also more transparent than reliance on a state-owned company, 
whose cash flows and investment plans can be manipulated for political or personal gain. If 
politicians wish to maximise their freedom to appropriate the rents for themselves or to allocate 
them to favoured constituencies, they will prefer opacity. 
In such circumstances, nationalisation may appear a simple solution. Greater direct 
control makes it easier for state elites to appropriate and allocate resource rents; and managing a 
state-owned company may be – or may appear to be – easier than trying to govern powerful 
private players. In short, weak institutions prompt rulers to opt for feasible, if sub-optimal, 
solutions – in this case, a reliance on direct control and coercion rather than contract, regulation 
and taxation. The solutions adopted, in turn, create obstacles to institutional improvements, as 
second-best solutions often help to entrench the very weaknesses that gave them birth. Ironically, 
the same institutional weaknesses that generate incentives to rely on direct control also 
undermine the state’s ability to manage state-owned companies well. In weak institutional 
environments, the creation of large state companies is likely to be associated with high levels of 
opacity, corruption and rent-seeking by insiders, who will be tempted to run the companies for 
                                                   
11. Nor is nationalisation the only purpose for which they are used: it is often a matter of private companies 
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of a large part of the oil industry are relatively easy to understand, but this development is unfortunate all 
the same.   
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their own benefit and will face strong incentives to resist increased transparency and 
accountability.  
These considerations suggest that it is not the re-nationalisations of the mid-2000s that 
need explaining but the privatisation policies of the 1990s. The real puzzle may be the emergence 
of a private oil industry in Russia in the first place. The story is in fact fairly well known14 and 
may be summarised very roughly as follows. A politically fragile regime succumbed to pressure 
from powerful regional, industrial and financial interests to break up and privatise the oil 
industry. In return, it gained badly needed domestic political support. Brief as it is, this two-
sentence account points to some of the reasons for the reversal of course in the early 2000s.  
To understand what has happened, it may be helpful to look first at the histories of an 
earlier generation of oil-producing states. Until the 1960s, a handful of international oil 
companies dominated the market, and oil-producing states had little option but to accept a 
substantial degree of foreign ownership and control over their reserves. Oil-producing states’ 
need to attract large-scale investment gave the oil companies tremendous leverage over taxation, 
regulatory policies and questions of institutional design. Over time, however, the original 
bargains between the oil companies and host governments ‘obsolesced’,15 as local elites’ leverage 
increased. This resulted from a combination of learning within the state administration and the 
emergence of smaller competitors to the international majors, competitors who were willing to 
cede more revenue and greater managerial control to host governments in order to capture market 
share from their larger rivals. Governments also profited from the rise of western oil services 
companies, which provided yet another way to access the kind of technology and expertise that 
the majors provided. In these circumstances, developing countries were able to conclude more 
favourable contracts with foreign investors, and in many cases, to nationalise their respective oil 
sectors outright. The capital-intensive nature of oil extraction helped, of course, since it imposed 
high barriers to exit when states began to revise the original bargains.16  
It is not difficult to see elements of the obsolescing bargain at work in Russia today. In 
the 1990s, a very weak regime made concessions to investors that it probably would not have 
made in other circumstances. These concessions became less palatable as oil prices rose, and the 
state’s extractive and coercive capacities recovered. The role of the oil boom should not be 
overlooked here: a host government’s assessment of the cost–benefit ratio of its bargain with 
investors is more likely to deteriorate if the investment is more profitable than anticipated. 
Dramatic oil price increases thus put the bargain under strain – and would have done so even in 
the absence of the kind of political conflicts that led to the state’s confrontation with Yukos in 
2003. The state’s new assertiveness is hardly a surprise. Woodruff (2005) points to a more 
general problem of which this is but one example: when institutions are still relatively weak and 
in a state of flux, sharp jumps in the value of assets can make it harder to stabilise/secure property 
rights. The greater the incentives for predators to try to seize assets, the stronger a property rights 
regime needs to be. Dramatic jumps in asset values increase those incentives, prompting agents 
                                                   
14. For an overview, see Lane (1999).  
15. See Vernon (1971) for the original model of the ‘obsolescing bargain’. See also Jones Luong (2004); 
Moran (1974); and Tugwell (1975). 
16. Eden et al. (2004:6) argue that bargains between states and multinationals in manufacturing sectors are far 
less likely to obsolesce, in large part because their investments tend to be smaller, more mobile and more 
closely tied to knowledge-based, firm-specific advantages.  
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to work all the harder to circumvent or simply overcome whatever legal or institutional 
protections are in place.  
These arguments about economic structure and obsolescing bargains should not by any 
means be taken to imply that factors such as ideology, ‘clan’ politics, geopolitical calculations or 
rent seeking do not matter. On the contrary, they clearly form an important part of the story. It is 
also important to emphasise that political leadership does matter. Institutional weaknesses do not 
predetermine policy choices, in Russia or elsewhere, but they do structure the choices politicians 
face: the opportunities for pursuing private/factional interests, geopolitical ambitions or 
ideological visions via (de facto or de jure) nationalisation are largely defined by the structural 
features of the situation. This suggests, in turn, that the recent expansion of state control in 
Russia’s ‘strategic’ sectors will not soon be reversed. While the political conjuncture could 
quickly change, the underlying structure of the Russian economy will evolve more slowly. It 
would therefore be unwise to expect a sharp reversal of course after the 2007–08 electoral cycle; 
those who believe that the Putin succession will bring a new wave of large-scale privatisation, as 
the incumbent elite tries to ‘cash out’, are likely to be disappointed. This makes it all the more 
important to understand what these shifts imply for the performance of the sectors affected. 
The implications of state expansion for economic performance  
Economically speaking, the expansion of state ownership in Russia since 2004 must be regarded 
as bad news. A large and growing body of research confirms that privately owned companies 
generally perform better than state-owned firms or those in mixed ownership, especially in 
sectors characterised by robust competition.17 There is little reason to think that Russia will prove 
an exception to this rule. On the contrary, the Russian state’s poor track record when it comes to 
owning and operating businesses would suggest the opposite: it has proved to be an exceptionally 
ineffective owner. At issue, then, is not merely the general question of state vs private ownership 
but the capacity of the Russian state, in particular, to manage large companies in technically 
complex sectors, given the country’s institutional weaknesses.  
A number of problems are already becoming apparent. First, policy-making in sectors 
where the state is particularly active tends to be characterised by long delays, frequent reversals 
of course and the prevalence of non-commercial considerations. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the oil sector: the authorities have delayed reform of the subsoil legislation for years on 
end, while continuing to use the defects of the current licensing regime to pressure companies. 
Even apparently clear decisions, such as the much-discussed Gazprom–Rosneft merger, can be 
reversed almost without warning. Not surprisingly, the contradictions and delays that afflict 
government decision-making in most spheres of policy also affect the corporate decision-making 
of the companies it controls. This not only undermines the performance of state companies, it 
also creates problems for the remaining private companies in those sectors. The performance of 
private oil and gas companies, in particular, has been affected by the state’s expansion, which has 
raised questions about whether and to what extent they can expect a more or less level 
competitive playing field in future.  
                                                   
17.  For an overview of international experience, see Boardman and Vining (1995); on the Russian case, see 
Tompson (2002). See also Megginson and Netter (2001); Commander et al. (1999); and the work surveyed 
in Nellis (1998).  
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Secondly, the country’s existing large state-owned companies are hardly models of good 
corporate governance,18 and their recent histories suggest that expanded state ownership will 
result in poorer performance by the companies affected. In general, Russian state-owned 
companies are run for the benefit of corporate insiders and their patrons in the state 
administration. They also tend to be financially rather opaque (many observers have commented 
on their poor reporting practices), which makes them attractive sources of funding for informal 
political or policy initiatives that, for various reasons, the authorities wish to keep off-budget. Yet 
rent-seeking and abuse of position are only part of the problem: even if all the agents involved 
were honest, the system of corporate governance devised for the major Russian state-owned 
companies would ensure that they could not operate efficiently. The ‘directive’ system for 
agreeing the positions to be adopted by state representatives at board meetings is cumbersome 
and frequently ensures that decisions simply have to be put off – the state institutions involved 
are unable to agree common positions quickly enough. Moreover, the boards of state companies 
are dominated by state appointees, many of whom really do not understand either the board’s role 
or the business itself and do not have incentives to invest time and effort into mastering these 
issues. In any case, the whole notion of state representatives in mixed-ownership companies 
contradicts Russian companies law, which insists that board directors do not represent specific 
shareholder interests. All directors are jointly and severally responsible to all shareholders. The 
directive system clearly violates that principle.  
A third, and related, problem stems from the tendency to appoint representatives of ‘line 
ministries’ to the boards of companies in the very sectors those ministries regulate; this leads to a 
conflation of regulatory and commercial functions. Far from effecting a clear separation of 
sectoral policy and ownership, the Russian government frequently combines the two. The direct 
involvement of line ministries in the governance of state companies is only part of the problem: 
sometimes the state effectively vests regulatory functions in state companies like Gazprom and 
Russian Railways. The major firm on a market may thus find itself regulating its rivals, with all 
the conflicts of interest that such an arrangement entails.  
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the players involved have any incentive to correct these 
deficiencies Too many of them have good reasons not to want good corporate governance in 
state-owned companies. One of the clearest indications of this is the continued existence of 
thousands of state unitary enterprises or GUPs. These are state concerns that are not even 
organised as corporations. The GUP was only ever intended to be a transitional form of 
ownership – GUPs were either to be corporatised (usually as a prelude to privatisation) or 
converted into treasury enterprises, operating as state bodies subject to tight financial controls. 
Because GUPs were meant to be a temporary phenomenon, the legislative framework governing 
their activities was never fully elaborated. While amendments to Russian law in 2002 went some 
way to correcting this, the legislation remains problematic: property rights are poorly regulated 
and monitoring is weak. This has made the GUP a popular organisational form for state 
enterprise managers and bureaucrats who oversee them; GUP managers and the state institutions 
that oversee particular GUPs have often put up fierce resistance when attempts were made to 
corporatise them. Even if no privatisation is envisaged, corporatisation involves a degree of 
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transparency and accountability that GUP insiders and their patrons in the bureaucracy often wish 
to avoid.19  
The overly complex structures of state-owned corporations similarly reflect a desire to 
reduce transparency and accountability, by ensuring that valuable assets are held in subsidiaries, 
or subsidiaries of subsidiaries, of state-owned firms. Rosneftegaz, for example, was created 
solely in order to serve as a vehicle for holding state shares in Rosneft that were used as collateral 
for the financing of the state’s purchase of Gazprom shares held by Gazprom subsidiaries. When 
the credits used to finance the purchase were paid off, Rosneftegaz was to be liquidated, and the 
shares it held in Rosneft and Gazprom were to be transferred back onto state’s balance sheet. In 
fact, this did not happen, and the explanation given for Rosneftegaz’s continued existence was 
that it allowed for greater ‘flexibility’ in the management of the assets in question.20 Keeping the 
shares in question off the state’s balance sheet ensured that they would not fall under the 
provisions of privatisation legislation and thus could be managed or even disposed of with far 
less scrutiny than otherwise. Income generated by the management or sale of the shares would 
also fall safely outside the norms of budgetary and privatisation legislation that would otherwise 
apply. It takes little cynicism and less imagination to see insiders’ interest at work here.  
As unpopular as many of the privatisations of the 1990s and early 2000s proved to be, 
they brought real economic benefits in their wake, in terms of improved performance.21 It would 
be difficult to argue that the re-nationalisation wave of 2004–07 has brought any benefits 
whatsoever to ordinary Russians, nor are they likely to do so. 
 
                                                   
19. Ironically, managers have an incentive to resist, regardless of their motivations, since the benefits of 
corporatisation accrue to the owners, not management. For an honest, efficient and competent manager, 
corporatisation involves significant costs and no obvious benefits for him/her. Additional oversight and 
reporting will simply be a hassle. For any other manager, it represents a threat, as his/her dishonesty, 
inefficiency or incompetence risk being exposed. 
20. Vedomosti, 24 and 27 July 2006, 28 December 2006.  
21. See Tompson (2002) and OECD (2004).  
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